The aftermath of the crisis. An overhaul of Ukraine’s banking sector.  OSW Studies 67, August 2017 by Sadowski, Rafal
T h e  a f T e r m a T h  o f  T h e  c r i s i s
a n  o v e r h a u l  o f  u k r a i n e ’ s  b a n k i n g  
s e c t o r
r a f a ł  s a d o w s k i
6 7
The afTermaTh of The crisis
an overhaul of ukraine’s banking 
sector
rafał sadowski
nuMber 67
WarsaW
July 2017
© copyright by ośrodek studiów Wschodnich
im. Marka karpia / centre for eastern studies
content editor
adam eberhardt, Wojciech konończuk
editor
halina kowalczyk
co-oPeration
katarzyna kazimierska, anna Łabuszewska
translation
Magdalena klimowicz
co-oPeration
nicholas furnival 
graPhic design 
Para-buch
PhotograPh on cover
yevgeniy11, shutterstock.com
dtP
groupMedia
charts
Wojciech Mańkowski
Publisher
ośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. marka Karpia 
centre for eastern studies
ul. koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland
Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00
fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
osw.waw.pl
isbn 978-83-65827-07-4
Contents
Theses  /5
I. ‘Bankopad’, or The Collapse of The Banks  /7
II. oligarChiC Banking /12
III. sTaBilisaTion – real or feigned? /17
IV. “privaTBank is The guaranTor of The ConsTiTuTion” /19
V. The siTuaTion afTer The Crisis /23
VI. The sTaTe-owned Banks – The ConTesT for ConTrol 
of finanCial flows /24
VII. The russian Banks are Changing Their spoTs  /27
VIII. The poliTiCal ConsequenCes of The Changes 
in The Banking seCTor /30
appendiX  /32
5O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
17
Theses
•	In	2014-2016,	Ukraine’s	 banking	 sector	was	 affected	by	what	has	proven	
to	be	the	most	serious	crisis	 in	the	country’s	modern	history.	Over	these	
three	years,	almost	half	of	 the	banks,	which	hold	30%	of	 the	sector’s	as-
sets	as	a	whole,	went	bankrupt.	Their	total	operating	deficit	amounted	to	
US$	11.8	billion	(with	the	value	of	assets	at	the	end	of	2016	standing	at	US$	
45.7	billion)	and	the	banks’	capital	in	hryvnias	was	reduced	almost	by	half.
•	A	crisis	on	this	scale	was	not	only	the	result	of	the	economic	collapse	ag-
gravated	by	the	war	with	Russia	(including	the	occupation	of	Crimea	and	
the	loss	of	control	of	a	part	of	the	Donbas)	and	the	domestic	political	crisis	
(including	the	Revolution	of	Dignity),	but	was	mainly	caused	by	the	dys-
function	of	the	banking	sector	and	bad	practices	connected	with	so-called	
oligarchic	banking,	which	had	been	present	in	the	sector	for	many	years.	
In	many	cases	the	banks	were	not	involved	in	typical	financial	operations	
and	instead	were	treated	by	their	owners	as	instruments	to	obtain	funds	
intended	for	doing	business	in	other	sectors	of	the	economy.	Moreover,	it	
turned	out	that	some	of	the	banks	de facto operated	in	pyramid	schemes.
•	It	can	be	estimated	that	in	2014–2016	the	losses	incurred	by	the	state	and	
banking	 sector	 clients	 exceeded	US$	20	billion	 (23%	of	Ukraine’s	GDP	 in	
2016).	These	losses	included	clients’	uninsured	lost	deposits,	state	payouts	
to	insured	deposits	for	insured	deposits,	unpaid	central	bank	refinancing	
loans,	 the	costs	of	refinancing,	and	costs	of	recapitalisation	 from	central	
bank	funds	and	from	state	budget.	A	portion	of	these	funds	(it	is	not	pos-
sible	to	determine	the	exact	sum)	has	been	illegally	transferred	from	the	
banking	system	to	companies	linked	to	the	banks’	owners	or	abroad.
•	Ukraine’s	 leadership	has	managed	 to	 stabilise	 the	 situation	 in	 the	bank-
ing	sector	and	halt	the	downward	trends,	in	large	part	due	to	considerable	
support	 from	and	under	major	external	pressure	 from	 the	 International	
Monetary	Fund,	the	European	Union	and	other	Western	states.	Significant	
amendments	were	introduced	to	regulate	the	functioning	of	the	banking	
sector,	 the	sector	 itself	was	cleansed	of	 insolvent	entities,	and	the	finan-
cial	standing	of	banks	operating	on	the	market	was	strengthened	and	im-
proved	by	way	of	restructuring	and	recapitalisation.
•	Regardless	of	the	achieved	stabilisation	of	the	situation	in	the	banking	sec-
tor,	it	is	too	early	to	determine	whether	the	reforms	brought		success	and	if	
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the	improvement	is	sustainable.	At	present,	continued	implementation	of	
legal	reforms	is	of	paramount	importance,	including	reforms	to	protect	the	
rights	of	lenders	(for	example	involving	the	improvement	of	loan	security	
requirements	and	credit	risk	assessment).	As	far	as	the	operation	of	spe-
cific	banks	is	concerned,	it	is	necessary	for	them	to	boost	their	lending	ac-
tivity	and	continue	their	restructuring	and	corporate	governance	reform.	
It	is	equally	important	to	further	strengthen	banking	supervision	and	to	
increase	the	efficiency	of	public-order	institutions	in	preventing	financial	
crime.
•	The	crisis	has	made	it	necessary	for	major	changes	to	be	 implemented	in	
the	 functioning	 and	 structure	 of	 the	 banking	 sector.	 Examples	 of	 these	
include:	the	consolidation	of	the	hitherto	relatively	fragmented	sector	(at	
present	almost	90%	of	assets	belong	to	 the	20	largest	banks);	 large	state-
owned	and	foreign	banks	achieving	a	dominant	market	position;	and	a	ma-
jor	reduction	in	the	market	share	of	banks	with	private	Ukrainian	capital	
which	previously	had	a	fairly	strong	position.
•	The	changes	 in	the	banking	sector	have	major	consequences	not	only	for	
the	functioning	of	the	Ukrainian	economy,	but	also	for	Ukraine’s	political	
system.	Prior	to	the	crisis,	 the	banks	had	been	an	important	 instrument	
the	oligarchs	used	to	generate	rent	(not	always	in	a	legal	and	transparent	
manner)	and	to	build	political	influence.	Recent	changes	in	how	the	sector	
functions	have	 limited	 the	opportunities	 to	apply	 illegal	practices	 in	 the	
form	which	has	been	used	to	date.	As	a	result	of	the	changes	in	the	banks’	
ownership	structure	it	is	no	longer	widely	possible	to	use	these	banks	as	
instruments	 for	 exerting	political	pressure.	However,	 it	 should	be	noted	
that	positive	trends	have	not	yet	been	solidified	and,	given	the	fact	that	the	
supervision	bodies	and	the	legal	system	are	weak	and	that	there	is	omni-
present	corruption,	a	number	of	irregularities	do	persist	in	the	functioning	
of	the	banking	sector.	
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I. ‘Bankopad’, or the collapse of the Banks 
The	deep	economic	crisis	which	came	hard	on	the	heels	of	the	dramatic	events	
surrounding	the	Revolution	of	Dignity	and	Russia’s	aggression	in	early	2014	has	
resulted	in	a	serious	slump	in	the	Ukrainian	economy	and	a	significant	deterio-
ration	of	macroeconomic	indicators.	It	involved,	for	example,	a	rapid	decline	of	
GDP	(-6.6%	in	2014	and	-9.9%	in	2015),	a	major	rise	in	the	rate	of	inflation	(reach-
ing	43%	at	the	end	of	2015),	an	almost	70%	devaluation	of	the	hryvnia,	and	a	drop	
of	around	15%	in	foreign	trade	turnover	and	investment	in	2014-2015.
Chart 1. Ukraine’s economy during the crisis, the change in GDP, inflation and 
the value of export of goods and services, in %
2014 2015 201620132012
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The	economic	crisis	was	one	of	the	factors	that	caused	the	collapse	in	the	bank-
ing	sector.	Most	importantly,	there	has	been	a	considerable	deterioration	of	
the	banks’	profitability	and	capital	flight.	In	2014	and	2015,	Ukrainian	banks	
recorded	an	operating	deficit	of	US$	3.3	billion	(3.6%	of	GDP)	and	US$	2.7	billion	
(3.1%	of	GDP)	respectively.	In	2016,	the	situation	began	to	gradually	stabilise	and	
on	1	December	the	deficit	stood	at	US$	0.7	billion.	However,	due	to	the	state	tak-
ing	over	Ukraine’s	largest	bank,	PrivatBank,	in	December	2016	and	to	the	need	
to	recapitalise	it,	the	banking	sector’s	operating	deficit	increased	to	US$	5.8	bil-
lion	(or	6.7%	of	GDP)	at	the	end	of	2016.	As	a	consequence,	over	these	three	years	
the	accumulated	deficit	amounted	to	US$	11.8	billion.	
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Chart 2. The banking sector’s operating indicators, in billion hryvnias
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Although	the	value	of	the	banks’	assets	expressed	in	Ukraine’s	national	cur-
rency	remained	practically	unchanged	and	amounted	to	125-130	billion	hry-
vnias,	due	to	the	hryvnia’s	devaluation,	the	value	of	these	assets	calculated	in	
US	dollars	fell	sharply	from	US$	159	billion	on	1	January	2014	to	US$	46	billion	
on	1	January	2017.	In	addition,	there	has	been	a	significant	outflow	of	bank-
ing	capital	–	from	192.6	billion	hryvnias	(US$	24.1	billion)	on	1	January	2014	to	
103.7	billion	hryvnias	(US$	4.3	billion)	on	1	January	2016	and	123.8	billion	hry-
vnias	(US$	4.5	billion)	on	1	January	2017.	This	posed	a	significant	threat	to	the	
banks’	financial	 liquidity,	especially	in	2014	and	2015.	However,	in	2016	the	
banks	gradually	began	to	improve	their	liquidity	due	to	recapitalisation	and	
restructuring.
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Chart 3. The banks’ assets and the value of their capital
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A	rapid	increase	in	the	value	of	the	so-called	‘non-performing	loans’	(NPL)	was	
a	major	problem.	According	to	the	National	Bank	of	Ukraine	(NBU),	their	share	
in	the	total	value	of	extended	loans	increased	from	7.7%	on	1	January	2014	to	
30.5%	on	1	January	2017.	However,	in	connection	with	the	state	taking	over	Pri-
vatBank	and	reassessing	its	loan	portfolio,	the	NBU	estimates	that	the	share	of	
non-performing	loans	may	rise	to	46%	in	2017.	According	to	the	IMF,	which	uses	
a	broader	definition	of	NPL,	an	increase	in	the	share	of	these	loans	was	recorded,	
from	26.1%	in	March	2014	to	48.2%	in	June	2016.	The	capital	flight	and	the	de-
terioration	of	financial	liquidity	contributed	to	a	drop	in	the	value	of	extended	
loans	which,	in	turn,	had	serious	consequences	for	the	economy	and	limited	
the	opportunities	for	local	companies	to	do	business.	Aside	from	the	domestic	
situation	caused	by	the	economic	crisis,	the	problems	faced	by	local	companies	
and	the	siphoning	off	of	funds	on	a	large	scale,	the	factors	that	caused	a	major	
increase	in	the	share	of	non-performing	loans	also	included	the	Russian	occupa-
tion	of	Crimea	and	the	war	in	the	Donbas,	since	in	territories	which	Kyiv	had	
lost	control	of	borrowers	simply	ceased	to	pay	off	their	loans	to	the	banks.	At	the	
end	of	March	2014,	the	value	of	loans	extended	by	Ukrainian	banks	in	Crimea	
and	in	the	Donbas	stood	at	95	billion	hryvnias	(around	US$	6	billion	according	
to	the	exchange	rate	applicable	at	that	time),	of	which	36	billion	hryvnias	(US$	
1.5	billion	according	to	the	exchange	rate	applicable	at	that	time)	were	loans	
taken	out	by	households.	The	share	of	the	eastern	regions	in	the	loan	portfolio	
of	individual	banks	was	between	25%	and	33%,	whereas	Crimea’s	share	was	
around	3%.	Over	70%	of	loans	taken	out	in	these	regions	are	not	being	serviced.	
According	to	estimates	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	losses	incurred	by	the	banks	
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in	connection	with	unpaid	loans	in	regions	outside	Kyiv’s	control	amount	to	
around	60	billion	hryvnias	(approximately	US$	2	billion	according	to	the	May	
2017	exchange	rate)1.
Chart 4. The value of extended loans in billion hryvnias and the proportion 
of unpaid loans in %
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Source:	National	Bank	of	Ukraine
The	decline	of	the	situation	in	the	banking	sector	resulted	in	several	banks	be-
coming	insolvent.	These	were	banks	that	were	unable	to	meet	the	requirements	
introduced	by	the	National	Bank	of	Ukraine	regarding	financial	liquidity,	the	
quality	of	capital	and	the	assets.	The	number	of	banks	operating	on	the	mar-
ket	fell	from	180	in	January	2014,	to	93	in	January	2017.	The	value	of	assets	of	
the	insolvent	banks	accounted	for	around	30%	of	the	total	value	of	assets	in	
the	banking	sector	as	a	whole.	The	insolvent	banks	were	almost	exclusively	
privately-owned	banks	with	Ukrainian	capital	(or	de facto	Ukrainian	banks	
registered	in	Cyprus	or	other	tax	havens)	and	the	reasons	behind	them	becom-
ing	insolvent	generally	included	the	lack	of	ability	or	will	on	the	part	of	their	
owners	to	recapitalise	them.
The	banks	 that	managed	 to	 sustain	 their	market	position	 are	 either	 state-
owned	banks	which	received	recapitalisation	from	the	central	bank,	or	foreign	
banks	which	could	count	on	support	from	their	investors	and	which	had	been	
1	 П.	Харламов,	Неподъемное	бремя:	как	банки	добиваются	погашения	по	кредитам	
в	Крыму	и	 зоне	АТО,	RBK-Ukraina,	 26	August	 2016;	https://daily.rbc.ua/rus/show/nepo-
demnoe-bremya-banki-dobivayutsya-pogasheniya-1472202911.html
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following	a	very	cautious	lending	policy.	As	a	consequence,	the	status	of	banks	
with	foreign	capital	increased	considerably	in	the	banking	sector.	Their	share	
in	the	regulatory	capital	of	the	sector	as	a	whole	increased	from	34%	in	January	
2014,	to	55.5%	in	December	2016.
Chart 5. ‘Bankopad’ – the drop in the number of banks operating in Ukraine
0
50
100
150
200
30
40
50
60
01.01.2012 01.01.2013 01.01.2014 01.01.2015 01.01.2016 01.12.2016 01.01.2017
Number of banks Number of banks with foreign capital
The share of foreign capital in the banks’ regulatory capital, in %
(right axis)
[%]
Source:	National	Bank	of	Ukraine
According	to	estimates,	in	2014-2016	the	total	losses	incurred	by	the	state	and	
the	clients	of	the	Ukrainian	banking	sector	amounted	to	around	US$	14.5	bil-
lion,	plus	the	costs	connected	with	state	assistance	and	nationalising	Ukraine’s	
largest	bank,	PrivatBank,	which	may	be	a	further	US$	6	billion.	A	major	portion	
of	these	losses	(it	is	difficult	to	determine	precisely	how	large)	may	be	funds	
illegally	 transferred	from	the	banking	sector.	US$	3	billion	are	refinancing	
loans	unpaid	to	the	central	bank	by	the	insolvent	banks,	US$	8.5	billion	are	
non-insured	clients’	deposits	which	had	been	lost,	and	another	US$	3	billion	are	
payments	made	by	the	state	as	insurance	for	deposits	which	clients	had	made	in	
banks	that	became	insolvent.	So	far,	only	a	minor	portion	of	the	lost	funds	has	
been	recovered	–	around	US$	150	million2.	According	to	official	information,	
as	at	the	beginning	of	2017,	the	Deposit	Guarantee	Fund	opened	3,835	criminal	
cases	with	a	total	value	of	295.5	billion	hryvnias	(US$	10.8	billion),	of	which	
262	cases	with	a	value	of	62.56	billion	hryvnias	(US$	2.3	billion)	involve	theft	
and	siphoning	off	funds	from	the	banks.
2	 I.	Koshiw,	Y.	Romanyshyn,	Ukraine	in	danger	of	never	recovering	stolen	billions,	Kyiv Post,	
23	December	2016.
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II. olIgarchIc BankIng
The	large	scale	of	the	crisis	in	Ukraine’s	banking	sector	was	not	only	caused	
by	the	poor	economic	situation,	but	mainly	by	structural	irregularities	and	
pathologies	in	the	banking	system	and	in	how	the	banks	function	which	had	been	
present	for	many	years.	This	situation	results	from	the	fact	that	an	oligarchic	
system	exists	in	Ukraine.	This	is	characterised	by	the	massive	and	non-trans-
parent	influence	on	state	institutions	which	informal	politico-business	groups	
have	and	by	a	high	level	of	corruption.	The	dysfunction	of	the	banking	sector	
has	also	been	caused	by	the	inefficiency	of	the	state	institutions	and	the	lack	
of	proper	supervision	of	this	sector	mainly	on	the	part	of	the	market	regulator	
and	financial	supervision	bodies	and	also	by	the	state	services	combating	finan-
cial	crime.	This	was	combined	with	insufficient	legal	regulations	(for	example	
the	insufficient		protection	of	lenders’	rights,	faulty	regulations	regarding	loan	
security	evaluation)	and	the	large-scale	corruption	and	weakness	of	prosecu-
tion	bodies	and	the	judiciary.
The	most	 frequent	pathologies	 in	 the	banking	system	can	be	 illustrated	by	
three	main	categories	of	banks	that	have	become	insolvent.	The	first	category	
includes	the	so-called	‘oligarchic	banks’	involved	in	obtaining	funds	for	com-
panies	owned	by	local	business	moguls.	The	second	category	are	the	so-called	
‘zombie	banks’	that	only	had	liabilities	and	no	capital,	and	were	used	to	siphon	
off	funds	to	offshore	locations.	The	third	category	includes	banks	involved	in	
money	laundering	which	had	neither	assets	nor	liabilities	and	were	used	to	hide	
and/or	transfer	illegal	funds	to	offshore	accounts.	In	addition,	the	practice	of	
siphoning	off	funds	from	state-owned	banks	should	be	mentioned,	for	example	
using	political	connections	to	obtain	attractive	loans	which	then	were	not	paid	
off.	The	banks	were	also	used	in	other	types	of	illegal	practices,	for	example	in	
‘corporate	raiding’	i.e.	illegal	company	takeovers.
In	the	oligarchic	system	the	banks	were	an	important	tool	to	manage	financial	
flows,	obtain	funds	and	to	finance	business	activity.	Practically	every	major	
oligarch	owned	a	bank	(or	even	several	banks)	or	indirectly	controlled	a	bank	
via	a	network	of	his	associates.	The	activity	of	a	bank	of	this	kind	focused	mainly	
on	providing	services	to	companies	owned	by	this	oligarch.	Only	later	could	this	
bank	offer	its	services	to	other	clients.
The	fact	that	the	owners	treated	these	banks	exclusively	as	tools	to	finance	their	
private	businesses,	and	not	as	companies	providing	finance	and	banking	ser-
vices	available	to	everyone,	was	one	of	the	most	frequent	irregularities	in	the	
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Ukrainian	banking	sector3.	In	practice,	this	type	of	activity	(so-called	‘captive	
banking’)	boiled	down	to	obtaining	capital	–	often	from	the	market	by	offering	
an	excessively	high	interest	rate	on	deposits	or	in	the	form	of	refinancing	ob-
tained	from	the	central	bank	–	and	then	transferring	the	funds	to	companies	
linked	to	the	bank’s	owner	as	loans	frequently	extended	on	very	favourable	con-
ditions	and	with	insufficient	collateral.	In	many	cases,	these	loans	were	offered	
to	companies	linked	to	the	bank’s	owners	or	shareholders	on	an	enormous	scale.	
Former	central	bank	governor	Valeriya	Hontaryeva	estimates	that	a	staggering	
97-100%	of	the	corporate	loan	portfolio	of	PrivatBank	(Ukraine’s	largest	bank	
which	until	the	end	of	December	2016	had	belonged	to	two	oligarchs,	Ihor	Ko-
lomoyskyi	and	Henadiy	Boholyubov)	was	extended	to	companies	linked	to	the	
owners4.	The	most	important	problem	was	that	these	loans	were	not	properly	
secured,	which	de facto	facilitated	the	transfer	of	major	funds	from	the	market.	
The	losses	incurred	in	this	way	either	turned	out	to	be	irreversible	or	had	to	be	
compensated	for	from	state	funds	(for	example,	in	the	case	of	deposits,	the	com-
pensation	was	paid	out	from	the	Deposit	Guarantee	Fund).	For	example,	after	
the	state	took	over	PrivatBank	it	turned	out	that	the	bank’s	capital	shortfall	
amounted	to	around	US$	5.7	billion	(at	the	beginning	of	2017	the	government	
adopted	a	plan	to	recapitalise	the	bank	with	approximately	US$	4.3	billion	and	
an	additional	US$1.5	billion	in	June	2017).	
3	 This	approach	is	well	illustrated	by	the	words:	“You’re	not	a	bank,	you’re	a	cash	desk.	You	
should	remember	it!”.	These	words	were	allegedly	said	in	October	2013	by	Oleksandr	Dyn-
nyk,	the	then	deputy	head	of	the	VETEK	company	owned	by	Serhiy	Kurchenko,	a	business-
man	linked	to	Yanukovych,	to	Ihor	Frantskevych,	then	president	of	Brokbiznesbank	that	
also	belonged	to	Kurchenko.	Frantskevych,	who	was	a	bank-manager	Kurchenko	had	hired	
to	run	his	bank,	had	objected	to	the	transfer	of	major	funds	from	the	bank.	In	December	
2013,	Frantskevych	was	replaced	by	Dynnyk	as	the	bank’s	president.	After:	Ю.	Сколотяный,	
Ограбление	 страны:	 "кейс	 Брокбизнесбанка"	 без	 ручки, Zerkalo Nedeli,	 18	December	
2015;	http://gazeta.zn.ua/finances/ograblenie-strany-keys-brokbiznesbanka-bez-ruch-
ki-_.html
4	 The	former	private	owners	of	PrivatBank	which	is	now	state-owned	deny	this	information.
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Chart 6. Captive banking in Ukraine
Companies linked
to the bank
or fictitious companies The bank
Clients
(deposits)
Refinancing loans
from the NBU
Correspondent accounts
in foreign banks
Offshore companies
and accounts linked
to the bank’s owners
Much	more	serious	consequences	involve	the	‘oligarchic	banks’	that	have	be-
come	insolvent.	For	example,	the	following	cases	of	banks	becoming	insolvent	
received	the	most	media	attention:	
	– Nadra	Bank	owned	by	Dmytro	Firtash,	an	oligarch	active	mainly	in	the	
chemical	and	gas	sector;	in	2008-2009	the	bank	received	recapitalisa-
tion	from	the	central	bank	of	around	US$	1.5	billion,	of	which	a	mere	
US$	13	million	has	been	recovered;
	– Finance	and	Credit	Bank	owned	by	Kostyantyn	Zhevago,	active	mainly	
in	 the	metallurgical	 and	machine-building	 sector;	 the	 bank’s	 clients	
lost	US$	380	million	and	the	state	lost	US$	60	million	of	recapitalisation	
which	has	not	been	returned;
	– VAB	Bank	owned	by	Oleh	Bakhmatyuk	who	 is	 doing	business	 in	 the	
agricultural	and	food	processing	sector;	US$	220	million	of	additional	
capital	provided	by	the	central	bank	has	been	lost	and	the	bank	guar-
antee	fund	had	to	compensate	the	clients	for	US$	395	million	of	lost	de-
posits;	so	far,	the	investigators	have	determined	that	the	total	value	of	
loans	the	bank	had	extended	to	companies	linked	to	Bakhmatyuk	was	
US$	125	million;
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	– banks	controlled	by	 individuals	associated	with	 former	president	Ya-
nukovych,	 for	 example	Brokbiznesbank	owned	by	Serhiy	Kurchenko	
and	several	 smaller	banks:	 for	example	 the	WBR	bank	owned	by	Ya-
nukovych’s	 son	 Oleksandr,	 Expobank	 controlled	 by	 Serhiy	 Arbuzov,	
Profinbank	controlled	by	Yuriy	Ivanyushchenko	and	Kyivska	Rus	con-
trolled	by	Yuriy	Boyko	and	Yevhen	Bakulin;
	– 25%	of	 its	assets	belonging	 to	 the	city	of	Kyiv;	 the	central	bank	esti-
mates	that	75%	of	its	loan	portfolio	was	actually	extended	to	companies	
linked	 to	 the	bank’s	 private	 stakeholders,	mainly	 the	 oligarch	Vasyl	
Khmelnytsky;
	– Forum	 Bank	 which	 belonged	 to	 Vadym	 Novinsky,	 a	 businessman	 of	
Russian	origin	active	in	the	metallurgical,	machine-	and	ship-building	
sector,	and	agriculture.
Irregularities	were	also	recorded	in	the	activity	of	the	so-called	‘zombie	banks’.	
These	banks	had	no	assets	and	their	operation	exclusively	involved	transfer-
ring	funds	to	offshore	locations,	mainly	to	accounts	in	tax	havens.	One	of	the	
operating	schemes	(the	so-called	‘Alpine	banks’	scheme)	involved	transferring	
funds	via	foreign	financial	institutions—for	example:	Meinl	Bank	and	Winter	
Bank	(registered	in	Austria),	East-West	United	Bank	(registered	in	Luxem-
bourg),	Bank	Frick	(registered	in	Liechtenstein),	and	Julius	Baer	(registered	
in	Switzerland).	Simply	put,	the	scheme	involved	the	Ukrainian	bank	opening	
correspondent	accounts	in	foreign	banks.	Next,	the	bank’s	Ukrainian	share-
holders	took	out	a	loan	from	the	foreign	bank	using	the	funds	transferred	to	
correspondent	accounts	as	collateral.	A	portion	of	this	loan	was	intended	as	re-
capitalisation	for	the	Ukrainian	bank	and	another	portion	was	transferred	to	
offshore	locations.	When	the	loan	was	not	paid	off,	the	funds	accumulated	on	
correspondent	accounts	were	seized	by	foreign	lenders.	According	to	Ukrain-
ian	central	bank	governor	Valeriya	Hontaryeva,	in	2014	alone	a	staggering	
US$	2	billion	could	have	been	siphoned	off	in	this	manner.	Similar	schemes	
for	transferring	money	to	offshore	locations	were	used	by	both	‘zombie	banks’	
and	‘oligarchic	banks’.
Finally,	some	of	the	banks	operated	in	a	de facto	pyramid	scheme.	One	exam-
ple	involves	the	Mykhailivskiy	Bank	which	offered	high	interest	on	deposits.	
The	obtained	funds	were	subsequently	forwarded	to	a	foundation	linked	to	the	
bank’s	owners,	making	them	exempt	from	banking	supervision	and	from	insur-
ance	offered	by	the	bank	guarantee	fund.	The	funds	were	then	transferred	to	
other	locations	by	the	individuals	who	actually	controlled	the	bank.	As	a	con-
sequence,	the	clients	lost	their	deposits	totalling	over	US$	38	million.
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When	the	political	and	economic	crisis	in	Ukraine	worsened	at	the	beginning	of	
2014,	numerous	bank	owners	or	the	individuals	who	actually	controlled	specific	
banks,	as	well	as	other	individuals	involved	in	business	activity,	began	to	trans-
fer	funds	from	Ukraine	to	offshore	locations	via	Ukrainian	banks.	This	contin-
ued	on	a	large	scale	until	around	2016.	The	reason	behind	this	strategy	was	the	
omnipresent	chaos	(surrounding	the	political	changes,	the	war	with	Russia,	the	
economic	crisis),	corruption,	weakness	of	state	institutions,	and	mistakes	made	
by	financial	supervision	bodies	and	security	institutions.	Detailed	information	
is	scarce	as	to	the	exact	amount	of	funds	that	could	have	been	transferred	in	
this	manner.	However,	it	can	be	stated	that	the	scale	of	this	activity	must	have	
been	enormous	considering	that	the	losses	incurred	by	the	state	in	connection	
with	this	practice	exceeded	US$	20	billion.
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III. staBIlIsatIon – real or feIgned?
The	crisis	in	the	banking	sector	has	become	one	of	the	most	serious	challenges	
the	Ukrainian	leadership	faced	after	2014.	An	improvement	of	the	situation	in	
the	banking	sector	was	considered	one	of	the	priorities	of	the	US$	17.5	billion	
support	programme	implemented	by	the	IMF5.	The	key	role	in	implementing	
the	reform	programme	was	played	by	the	NBU	(which	is	the	central	bank	and	
market	regulator)	in	collaboration	of	the	government	and	the	Ministry	of	Fi-
nance	and	with	support	from	the	president,	as	well	as	significant	substantive	
and	financial	assistance	from	the	IMF	without	which	no	improvement	would	
have	been	possible.
The	counter-crisis	actions	carried	out	in	2014-2016	mainly	involved:
	– performing	a	thorough	assessment	of	the	situation	in	the	sector	and	of	
the	banks’	financial	standing,	
	– cleansing	the	banking	system	of	insolvent	banks	and/or	those	that	op-
erated	illegally	or	which	were	de facto	operating	in	pyramid	scheme,	
	– improving	the	financial	situation	of	the	other	banks	operating	on	the	
market,	
	– increasing	transparency	in	how	the	banking	sector	functions,	
	– improving	 corporate	 governance	 and	 the	 functioning	 of	 state-owned	
banks.	
In	2015-2016,	the	central	bank	performed	a	diagnostic	of	the	situation	of	the	
largest	banks.	This	involved	assessing	their	financial	liquidity,	loan	portfolios,	
investor	relations	(including	loans	extended	to	individuals	linked	to	the	owners).	
The	analysis	comprised	two	elements:	an	assessment	of	the	quality	of	assets	and	
the	performance	of	stress	tests	alongside	an	analysis	of	the	banks’	resilience	to	
macroeconomic	shocks.	It	covered	the	60	largest	banks	which	hold	97%	of	the	
sector’s	assets.	The	stress	tests	revealed	that	the	quality	of	the	loan	portfolio	was	
much	worse	than	the	banks	had	declared.	At	the	same	time,	the	tests	formed	
the	basis	for	a	programme	to	be	devised	involving	the	central	banks	recapitalis-
ing	the	banks.	Moreover,	in	the	initial	stage	of	the	crisis,	regulations	were	im-
plemented	to	limit	the	transfer	of	funds	to	offshore	locations.	At	present,	these	
regulations	are	being	cancelled	due	to	an	improvement	of	the	economic	situation.
5	 International	Monetary	Fund,	Second	review	under	the	extended	fund	facility	and	requests	
for	waivers	of	non-observance	of	performance	criteria,	rephasing	of	access	and	financing	
assurances	review,	IMF	Country	Report	No.	16/319,	September	2016.
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The	present	situation	indicates	that	the	authorities	have	managed	to	stabilise	
the	situation	in	the	banking	sector	and	halt	the	downward	trends.	This	is	con-
firmed	by	specific	indicators	that	show	a	slow	increase	in	the	banks’	assets,	capi-
tal	and	revenues,	as	well	as	an	increase	in	the	value	of	loans	offered	to	clients.	It	
is	rather	unlikely	that	other	major	banks	will	become	insolvent	as	almost	all	in-
solvent	and	non-transparent	banks	have	been	removed	from	the	market.	When	
the	state	took	over	Ukraine’s	largest	bank,	PrivatBank,	at	the	end	of	December	
2016	and	launched	its	reorganisation	programme,	it	became	possible	to	remove	
the	final	potential	major	threat	to	the	stability	of	the	banking	system	posed	by	
PrivatBank’s	potential	collapse.	The	NBU	is	hoping	that	in	2017	the	banks	will	
manage	to	achieve	a	positive	balance.
Despite	positive	trends	in	the	banking	sector	and	a	slow	improvement	of	the	
macroeconomic	situation,	it	is	too	early	to	conclude	that	the	upward	trends	are	
sustainable.	Using	vivid	language	one	can	say	that	the	fire	was	put	out	and	now	
it	is	necessary	to	rebuild	what	has	been	destroyed.	In	2017,	the	most	important	
goals	of	the	reform	programme	supervised	by	the	NBU	involve	resuming	and	in-
creasing	the	banks’	lending	activity,	introducing	legal	regulations	to	protect	the	
rights	of	lenders,	including	new	rules	for	loan	risk	assessment	and	loan	security,	
as	well	as	implementing	new	banking	supervision	rules	and	banks’	liquidity	
standards.	The	unstable	domestic	political	situation,	caused	by	strong	internal	
conflict,	continues	to	be	a	major	problem	that	translates	into	the	poor	quality	
and	inefficiency	of	parliamentary	work.	For	example,	in	2016	the	Ukrainian	
parliament	did	not	manage	to	adopt	any	significant	legal	acts		of	major	signifi-
cance	to	the	banking	sector	which	contributed	to	an	improvement	in	how	it	
functions.	In	addition,	attention	should	be	paid	to	the	extremely	low	level	of	
efficiency	of	state	institutions	in	recovering	funds	siphoned	off	from	the	bank-
ing	sector.	At	the	same	time,	due	to	the	weakness	of	the	applicable	law	and	of	
the	judiciary,	the	NBU’s	decisions,	including	those	pertaining	to	the	closing	of	
banks,	are	being	repealed	in	the	courts.	Even	the	activity	of	the	National	Bank	of	
Ukraine	has	come	under	scrutiny	by	investigative	bodies.	In	February	2017,	the	
National	Anti-Corruption	Bureau	of	Ukraine	(NABU)	launched	an	investigation	
into	the	legitimacy	of	NBU	spending	funds	to	refinance	banks	in	2015-2016.	So	
far,	no	charges	have	been	formulated.	
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IV. “prIVatBank Is the guarantor 
of the constItutIon”6
The	very	strong	position	of	one	market	participant,	PrivatBank,	was	and	con-
tinues	to	be	a	unique	feature	of	Ukraine’s	banking	system.	Until	December	2016,	
it	had	belonged	to	two	oligarchs:	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	and	Henadiy	Boholyubov	
(who	owned	49.98%	and	41.57%	of	the	shares	respectively).	On	21	December	2016,	
100%	of	the	bank’s	shares	was	taken	over	by	the	state	represented	by	the	Min-
istry	of	Finance	for	the	symbolic	price	of	1	hryvnia.
PrivatBank,	one	of	Ukraine’s	oldest	banks,	built	its	strong	position	after	the	
2008-2009	financial	crisis.	Since	then,	it	continued	to	increase	its	assets	at	
a	much	faster	pace	than	other	banks	did.	Between	Q1	2007	and	Q1	2016,	the	
value	of	assets	of	all	Ukrainian	banks	rose	by	400%,	whereas	for	PrivatBank	
this	figure	was	752%.	Between	the	beginning	of	2010	until	the	autumn	of	2016,	
the	bank’s	market	share	rose	from	16%	to	36%	in	the	retail	clients	segment	and	
from	11%	to	25%	in	the	corporate	clients	segment.	When	it	was	taken	over	by	
the	state,	the	bank	provided	services	to	20.5	million	retail	clients	(more	than	
half	of	Ukraine’s	adult	population),	500,000	one-person	businesses	(70%	of	
the	total)	and	600,000	larger	companies	(56%	of	the	total)7.	The	bank	owed	
its	impressive	reach	to	the	development	of	the	network	of	offices	and	ATMs	
across	the	country,	as	well	as	to	its	credit	card	services,	in	particular	its	high	
quality	innovative	IT	services	(including	the	Privat24	system	developed	ex-
clusively	for	this	bank).	Due	to	its	size,	the	bank	was	considered	as	‘a	system	
bank’,	i.e.	one	of	the	banks	of	key	significance	for	Ukraine’s	banking	system	
(in	2016,	aside	 from	PrivatBank,	 two	state-owned	banks	Oschadbank	and	
Ukreximbank	were	also	on	this	list),	which	is	defined	as	an	institution	which	
would	pose	a	threat	to	the	stability	of	Ukraine’s	banking	system	were	it	to	
become	insolvent	or	operate	in	an	improper	manner.	This	meant	that	the	state	
offered	special	treatment	to	this	bank,	including	special	supervision,	and	was	
obliged	to	support	it.
6	 This	is	a	quotation	from	a	skit	by	Ukrainian	comedy	group	Kvartal	95.	In	the	skit,	Ihor	Kolo-
moyskyi	talks	to	President	Poroshenko:	“Poroshenko:	What	kind	of	joke	is	that?	PrivatBank	
is	the	guarantor	of	the	constitution?;	Kolomoyskyi:	Isn’t	it	the	case?”	after:	https://youtu.
be/Et-mM92HPxQ?t=434	(from	7:14	till	7:30	min.)
7	 Data	after:	Елена	Шкарпова,	Хорошийбанк,	плохойакционер,	злойрегулятор,	voxukraine.
org	for	Ukrayinska Pravda,	20	January	2017;www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2017/01/20/7132961	
Юлия	Самаева,	"Приват"	—	государство:	заходдомата,	Zerkalo Nedeli,	9	December	2016;	http://
gazeta.zn.ua/macrolevel/privat-gosudarstvo-za-hod-do-mata-_.html
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However,	under	previous	shareholders	PrivatBank’s	activity	sparked	contro-
versy	mainly	due	to	non-transparent	financial		operations.	Banks	owned	by	Pri-
vatBank	in	Latvia	and	Cyprus	incurred	fines	from	local	supervision	bodies	for	
money	laundering	(in	2015	the	Cypriot	regulator	imposed	a	€1.5	million	penalty	
on	a	subsidiary	of	PrivatBank).	The	bank	was	also	involved	in	siphoning	off	funds	
in	the	so-called	Alpine	banks	scheme;	according	to	estimates	in	2014-2016	more	
than	€1.16	billion	may	have	been	siphoned	off	in	this	way.	Over	the	last	three	
years,	other	methods	for	siphoning	off	funds	included	the	so-called	‘back-to-
back	loans’8,	according	to	estimates	the	amount	siphoned	off	this	way	could	be	
at	least	€700	million.	Serious	doubts	have	also	emerged	regarding	the	loans	of	
around	€2	billion	extended	in	2014-2016	which	have	de facto been	injected	into	
companies	linked	to	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi.	The	practice	boiled	down	to	extending	
loans	to	various	fictitious	companies	with	minimum	capital	(worth	around	€36)	
registered	in	Kharkiv	and	Dnipropetrovsk9	and	mainly	involved	in	the	retail	
sale	of	fuels	(companies	controlled	by	Kolomoyskyi	included	Ukrnafta,	the	main	
player	on	Ukraine’s	oil	market),	from	where	the	money	was	transferred	to	off-
shore	locations10.	The	capital	that	has	been	siphoned	off	from	the	banks	included	
both	funds	obtained	on	the	market	(for	example	deposits,	loans)	and	refinancing	
loans	from	the	state.	Considering	the	scale	and	the	nature	of	the	bank’s	activity,	
it	is	possible	to	conclude	that	when	the	economic	crisis	broke	out	in	Ukraine,	
the	bank’s	owners	decided	to	take	advantage	of	it	to	siphon	off	as	many	funds	
as	possible	to	save	their	own	revenues.	In	doing	so,	they	exploited	the	fact	that	
due	to	the	bank’s	significance	for	the	economy	as	a	whole	the	government	was	
forced	to	offer	assistance	to	it	regardless	of	its	deteriorating	financial	standing	
(the	assistance	offered	by	the	government	included	refinancing	loans,	and	the	
postponement	of	the	implementation	of	certain	administrative	orders	by	the	
bank).	As	a	consequence,	according	to	official	information	in	December	2016,	
the	bank’s	funding	shortfall	amounted	to	around	148	billion	hryvnias	(around	
US$	5.7	billion).	At	the	same	time,	due	to	its	size	the	bank	was	being	used	by	its	
previous	owners	as	a	tool	to	put	pressure	on	the	government	and	to	force	it	to	
take	political	decisions	that	would	be	favourable	for	this	group.
8	 ‘Back-to-back	loan’	is	a	loan	two	companies	from	different	countries	mutually	grant	each	
other.	It	is	expressed	in	the	currency	of	the	lending	company’s	country	(for	example	Ukrain-
ian	companies	extend	a	loan	expressed	in	hryvnias	to	a	company	registered	in	the	EU	and	
a	European	company	offers	a	Ukrainian	company	a	loan	expressed	in	euros).	The	purpose	of	
this	transaction	is	to	secure	oneself	against	exchange	rate	fluctuation.
9	 The	city	is	now	called	Dnipro.
10	 Graham	Stack,	How	PrivatBank	billions	vanished	through	Alpine	 ‘transit	banks’,	bneIn-
telliNews,	20	December	2016;	http://www.intellinews.com/how-privatbank-billions-van-
ished-through-alpine-transit-banks-112551/?source=ukraine
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However,	as	 the	 shortfall	 in	 the	bank’s	finances	grew,	 the	 two	sides	 found	
themselves	in	a	difficult	situation.	Kolomoyskyi	and	Boholyubov	were	not	able,	
or	rather	were	not	willing,	to	recapitalise	the	bank.	Were	the	bank	to	become	
insolvent,	though,	they	would	suffer	major	financial	losses	(for	example,	they	
would	be	responsible	for	the	lost	deposits	and	for	acting	to	the	detriment	of	the	
company,	which	would	expose	them	to	criminal	liability).	The	state	authorities	
(i.e.	the	president,	the	government,	the	central	bank),	for	their	part,	would	not	
let	PrivatBank	become	insolvent	(or	perhaps	did	not	want	to)	due	to	the	social	
cost	potentially	associated	with	this	failure	(more	than	20	million	clients)	and	
the	threat	of	the	collapse	of	the	financial	system	as	a	whole.	In	this	situation,	
and	also	under	pressure	from	the	international	community	(including	the	IMF),	
a	decision	was	made	that	the	state	would	purchase	100%	of	the	bank’s	shares	
for	the	symbolic	price	of	1	hryvnia.	In	addition	to	this,	the	bank’s	capitalisa-
tion	was	increased	(by	the	central	bank	via	refinancing	loans	and	the	issue	of	
internal	bonds)	by	116.8	billion	hryvnias	(US$	4.3	billion),	of	which	107	billion	
hryvnias	was	provided	immediately	after	the	state	took	over	the	bank	back	in	
December	2016.	Another	tranche	of	state	financial	support	worth	US$1.5	billion	
to	the	bank	was	transferred	in	June	2017.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	bank	had	
already	received	refinancing	loans	totalling	US$	1.2	billion.
It	was	against	this	backdrop	that	another	conflict	emerged	over	how	the	state	
took	over	the	bank.	The	bank’s	previous	private	owners	filed	a	lawsuit	with	
a	court	in	London	against	the	present	owner,	i.e.	the	state,	concerning	the	pur-
chase	of	the	bonds	previously	issued	by	the	bank	worth	US$	600	million.	The	
state,	for	its	part,	explained	that	the	bank’s	nationalisation	had	been	carried	
out	in	line	with	the	‘bail-in’	rescue	procedure	which	forces	the	lenders	of	the	
rescued	bank	to	bear	some	of	the	costs	and	that	the		bonds	were	seized	to	cover	
these	costs.	At	the	same	time,	court	trials	are	underway	in	which	the	NBU’s	de-
cisions	to	recognise	some	of	the	borrowers	as	persons	linked	to	the	bank	and,	as	
such,	forced	to	bear	the	costs	of	rescuing	the	bank	under	the	bail-in	procedure,	
have	been	appealed	against (this	concerns	for	example	the	companies	owned	by	
or	linked	to	brothers	Hryhoriy	and	Ihor	Surkis,	business	partners	of	the	bank’s	
previous	owners11).
Summing	up,	as	a	whole	the	transaction	involving	the	state	taking	over	the	
bank	was	favourable	for	Kolomoyskyi	and	Boholyubov,	who	have	cast	off	their	
11	 For	more	on	this	see:	Ю.	Самаева,	НБУ	vs	"Динамо".	Кто	забьет	в	наши	ворота?,	Zerkalo 
Nedeli,	 19	May	 2017;	 https://gazeta.zn.ua/macrolevel/nbu-vs-dinamo-kto-zabet-v-nashi-vo-
rota-248847_.html
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problems	associated	with	a	bank	that	needed	enormous	recapitalisation,	hav-
ing	siphoned	off	major	funds	from	it.	The	state,	for	its	part,	was	placed	in	a	dead	
end,	as	on	the	one	hand	it	assumed	liability	for	considerable	costs	of	the	bank’s	
restructuring	and	on	the	other,	managed	to	avoid	the	insolvency	of	a	bank	of	
strategic	importance,	thus	maintaining	the	country’s	financial	stability	and	
avoiding	major	social	costs.
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V. the sItuatIon after the crIsIs
The	2014-2016	crisis	has	resulted	in	very	serious	changes	in	how	Ukraine’s	bank-
ing	sector	is	structured	and	functions.	The	sector’s	structure	became	more	con-
centrated;	at	the	beginning	of	2017,	the	20	largest	banks	held	89.4%	of	the	assets	
present	in	the	system	as	a	whole,	whereas	in	December	2013	the	proportion	had	
been	73%.	The	banks	that	have	become	insolvent	almost	exclusively	belonged	to	
Ukrainian	private	capital	(except	two	small	state-owned	banks	–	Rodovid	and	
Bank	Kyiv).	As	a	consequence,	the	role	and	the	share	of	state-owned	banks	and	
banks	with	foreign	capital	have	increased	significantly.	The	Ukrainian	state	
owns	seven	banks	(including	Ukraine’s	largest	bank,	PrivatBank)	which	in	to-
tal	hold	51.3%	of	the	system’s	assets,	whereas	in	December	2013	the	proportion	
had	been	18.1%.	The	share	of	assets	controlled	by	banks	with	foreign	capital	
increased	from	25.9%	in	December	2013	to	34.9%	in	December	2016.	Over	the	
same	period,	the	share	of	assets	held	by	private	banks	fell	from	56.1%	to	13.8%.
The	period	between	December	2013	and	December	2016	also	saw	a	major	change	
in	the	distribution	of	deposits	made	by	retail	clients.	The	share	of	state-owned	
banks	rose	from	13.3%	to	59.6%,	the	share	of	foreign	banks	increased	from	22.2%	
to	26.4%,	and	the	share	of	Ukrainian	private	banks	fell	from	64.6%	to	14%.	At	
present,	only	two	out	of	Ukraine’s	20	largest	banks	are	privately-owned	(PUMB,	
owned	by	Rinat	Akhmetov,	and	Pivdennyi,	owned	by	a	group	of	businessmen	
from	Odessa),	and	the	state	owns	Ukraine’s	four	largest	banks	(PrivatBank,	
Oschadbank,	Ukreximbank,	Ukrgasbank).	The	remainder	are	controlled	by	
foreign	investors.
Chart 7. The structure of the banking sector, the share of net assets in %
10
20
30
40
50
60
State-owned banks
Foreign banks
Privately owned banks
PrivatBank
[%]
01.01.2014 01.01.2015 01.01.2016 01.07.2016 01.10.2016 01.01.2017
Source:	National	Bank	of	Ukraine
* In December 2016, PrivatBank was taken over by the state
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VI. the state-owned Banks – the contest 
for control of fInancIal flows
Until	the	Revolution	of	Dignity	and	the	economic	crisis,	the	main	problem	of	the	
state-owned	banks	had	involved	individuals	holding	power	or	their	aides	using	
these	banks	as	tools	to	obtain	low-cost	funding	or	to	siphon	off	funds	belonging	
to	the	state.	In	doing	so,	these	individuals	used	the	fact	that	these	banks	were	
state-owned	banks	of	strategic	significance	for	the	system	as	a	whole,	which	
was	why	the	state	would	not	allow	them	to	become	insolvent	and	was	forced	
to	continuously	provide	them	with	support.	It	is	difficult	to	assess	how	much	
money	has	been	siphoned	off	from	state-owned	banks	as	no	precise	estimates	
are	available.	The	scale	of	recapitalisation	of	state-owned	banks	may	indirectly	
be	indicative	of	the	costs	borne	by	the	state	treasury.	Between	2008	and	2016,	
the	state’s	spending	on	this	purpose	amounted	to	US$	8.7	billion.	This	does	not	
mean	that	the	entire	sum	has	been	siphoned	off,	it	only	suggests	that	the	scale	
of	this	practice	may	have	been	enormous.
The	state-owned	banks’	‘politically-motivated’	lending	to	companies	controlled	
by	politicians	and	 individuals	 linked	 to	 them	had	been	a	common	practice	
throughout	the	period	of	Ukraine’s	independence,	but	it	evidently	gained	mo-
mentum	during	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	presidency	in	2010-2013.	A	whole	range	of	
methods	was	being	used	to	this	end.	One	such	method	involved	extending	huge	
loans	without	properly	securing	them	(or	securing	them	with	fictitious	assets).	
In	2011,	the	company	SCM	owned	by	Rinat	Akhmetov,	using	the	mediation	of	
an	associated	company	ESU	linked	to	it,	took	out	two	loans	from	Ukreximbank	
and	Oschadbank	worth	US$	2	billion	each	for	the	purchase	of	a	stake	in	the	
company	Ukrtelecom	(which	at	that	time	was	being	privatised).	The	loans	are	
not	being	paid	off	and	ESU	has	already	restructured	its	related	debt	twice12.	
Another	example	of	banks	offering	funding	to	businesses	run	by	politicians	in-
volves	Oschadbank	extending	a	loan	worth	US$	600	million	to	the	Active	Solar	
capital	group	linked	to	Andriy	Klyuyev,	an	influential	politician	in	the	Yanu-
kovych	era,	who	informally	controlled	this	bank.	It	should	be	noted	that	a	loan	
of	this	size	violated	the	standards	regarding	debt	concentration	to	one	credi-
tor.	Oschadbank	only	recently	managed	to	obtain	court	decisions	enabling	it	to	
collect	the	debt	in	its	full	amount.	According	to	media	reports,	around	a	third	
12	 What	makes	this	case	even	more	striking	is	that	Akhmetov	not	only	bought	the	shares	in	the	
state-owned	company	at	an	attractive	price	(US$	10	billion)—he	also	using	money	from	loans	
taken	out	from	from	state-owned	banks	(US$	4	billion)	which	so	far	have	not	been	paid	off	
(de	facto	this	means	that	instead	US$	10	billion	he	paid	US$	6	billion	from	his	own	funds).
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of	Ukreximbank’s	corporate	loan	portfolio	was	extended	to	companies	linked	
to	Viktor	Polishchuk,	a	businessman	who	used	to	be	particularly	active	in	the	
Yanukovych	era.	Other	illegal	practices	included	overestimating	the	value	of	
collateral	when	taking	out	a	loan,	understating	the	cost	of	loans	and	extending	
loans	against	the	bank’s	lending	strategy13.
Other	major	problems	the	state-owned	banks	face	include	mismanagement	and	
widespread	corruption.	Between	the	beginning	of	2016	and	February	2017,	the	
courts	issued	332	verdicts	in	criminal	cases	involving	Oschadbank	and	114	in-
volving	Ukreximbank.	In	most	cases	these	banks	were	the	aggrieved	party.
Control	of	the	state-owned	banks	also	has	major	political	significance.	The	com-
position	of	the	management	and	supervisory	boards	is	the	result	of	political	
arrangements	made	within	the	ruling	coalition.	The	present	governing	bod-
ies	of	the	largest	state-owned	banks	are	linked	either	to	People’s	Front	and	its	
leader,	former	prime	minister	Arseniy	Yatsenyuk	(for	example	Oschadbank	
and	Ukrgasbank)	or	President	Poroshenko	(for	example	Ukreximbank,	but	also	
the	NBU).	As	for	PrivatBank,	Oleksandr	Shlapak	has	been	appointed	its	presi-
dent.	His	candidacy	has	been	agreed	by	way	of	compromise	between	President	
Poroshenko	and	Prime	Minister	Groysman	but	he	also	has	good	relations	with	
other	politicians	(including	Yatsenyuk).
The	programme	for	reforming	how	state-owned	banks	are	managed	(which	is	
also	an	element	of	the	IMF	assistance	programme)	announced	by	the	govern-
ment	assumes	an	improvement	of	the	banks’	financial	standing	and	corporate	
governance,	followed	by	the	privatisation	of	a	portion	of	their	shares.	The	gov-
ernment	is	planning	to	sell	a	portion	(i.e.	20%)	of	its	stake	in	state-owned	banks.	
Due	to	the	fact	that	no	other	investors	are	interested	in	entering	the	Ukrainian	
market,	the	government	is	primarily	hoping	that	international	financial	insti-
tutions	such	as	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	will	be	
the	new	shareholders.	The	government	has	recently	announced	that	over	the	
next	five	years	it	intends	to	reduce	the	share	of	state-owned	banks	in	Ukraine’s	
banking	sector	from	the	present	level	of	more	than	50%	down	to	30%.	According	
to	the	strategy	for	reforming	state-owned	banks	which	the	government	adopted	
in	2015,	the	privatisation	of	Oschadbank	and	Ukreximbank	is	to	be	launched	
in	mid-2018,	and	the	privatisation	of	Ukrgasbank	by	the	end	of	2017.	Taking	
13	 Д.	Марчак,	Что	не	так	с	госбанками	в	Украине	и	как	это	исправить,	Ekonomichna Pravda,	
1	September	2016;	http://www.epravda.com.ua/cdn/cd1/2016/08/chto-ne-tak-s-gos-banka-
mi/index.html
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account	of	the	situation	in	the	banking	sector,	the	lack	of	interest	on	the	part	
of	foreign	investors	and	the	fiasco	of	the	privatisation	programme	which	has	
already	been	carried	out	in	other	sectors	of	the	economy,	it	is	rather	unlikely	
that	these	deadlines	will	be	kept.
27
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
17
VII. the russIan Banks are changIng theIr spots 
The	financial	crisis	and	–	most	importantly	–	the	war	with	Russia	have	signifi-
cantly	impacted	the	position	of	banks	with	Russian	capital	in	Ukraine’s	banking	
sector.	The	change	is	mainly	evident	in	how	they	function,	not	in	their	share	in	
the	sector	as	a	whose,	as	this	has	de facto	even	increased.	Until	Russia’s	aggres-
sion,	Russian	banks	or	banks	owned	by	Russian	citizens	but	registered	in	other	
countries	had	occupied	a	major	place	on	the	Ukrainian	market	and	their	market	
share	was	11%,	or	11.53%	including	banks	with	Russian	minority	capital14.	Over	
two	years,	this	proportion	continued	to	rise	and	on	1	October	2016	it	stood	at	
15.64%	for	banks	with	a	controlling	stake	and	15.84%	for	all	banks	with	Russian	
capital	(including	banks	owned	by	Russians	but	registered	in	other	countries).
Chart 8. The share of banks with Russian capital in Ukraine’s banking sector 
in billion hryvnias*
Total assets of banks with Russian capital
The share of banks with Russian capital in the sector as a whole in % (right axis)
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Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	data	compiled	by	the	National	Bank	of	Ukraine
*	The share of all banks with Russian capital has been taken into account, including those with a minority stake, 
and banks owned by Russian citizens but registered in other countries.
The	main	reason	behind	the	increased	significance	of	Russian	banks	has	been	
the	collapse	of	a	number	of	Ukrainian	private	banks	and	the	capital	flight	from	
the	Ukrainian	market.	 In	addition	 to	 this,	during	 the	crisis	Russian	banks	
14	 This	figure	also	includes	Alfa	Bank	which	belongs	to	ABH	Holdings,	a	company	registered	
in	Luxembourg,	whose	main	shareholders	are	Russians	holding	Israeli	and	Russian	citizen-
ship,	Mikhail	Fridman	and	German	Khan,	Russian	citizens	Aleksey	Kuzmichev	and	Pyotr	
Aven,	and	the	Italian	bank	UniCredit	SpA.
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received	 considerable	 recapitalisation	 from	 their	 shareholders,	which	 also	
enabled	them	to	strengthen	their	market	position	(the	recapitalisation	was	not	
provided	in	the	form	of	payments	of	funds	but	mainly	by	converting	interbank	
loans	and	subordinated	loans	from	parent	companies	into	regulatory	capital).	
The	total	value	of	recapitalisation	provided	to	Russian	banks	stood	at	US$	2	bil-
lion	in	2015	and	at	more	than	US$	1.4	billion	in	2016	(this	accounted	for	a	major	
portion	of	foreign	direct	investment	in	Ukraine	and	made	Russia	Ukraine’s	big-
gest	foreign	investor).
Russia’s	aggression	against	Ukraine	has	placed	Russian	banks	in	a	very	diffi-
cult	situation.	This	was	mainly	caused	by	the	fact	that	they	were	perceived	by	
the	clients	as	institutions	stemming	from	the	aggressor	country	and	as	such	
had	a	very	negative	image.	In	January	and	later	in	March	and	April	2017	picket	
lines	were	organised	in	front	of	these	banks’	headquarters	and	their	offices	
were	blocked	in	several	cities	in	Ukraine	(including	Kyiv	and	Kharkiv).	This	
perception	has	caused	numerous	clients	to	withdraw	from	these	banks’	ser-
vices.	Between	January	2014	and	April	2016,	the	value	of	deposits	made	by	retail	
clients	in	Russian	banks	fell	from	9.3%	to	5.8%	of	the	total	value	of	retail	client	
deposits	in	the	banking	system;	for	corporate	clients	the	proportion	fell	from	
8.3%	to	3.3%	of	the	total	value	of	deposits15.	Frequent	cases	of	loans	not	being	
honoured	had	equally	painful	consequences	and	significantly	worsened	the	
Russian	banks’	loan	portfolio.	At	the	end	of	2015,	unpaid	loans	accounted	for	
67%	of	the	loan	portfolio	of	Sberbank,	85%	of	Prominvestbank’s	and	a	staggering	
95%	of	VTB’s.	In	addition,	the	Russian	banks	have	lost	access	to	refinancing	from	
the	NBU	and	could	only	count	on	support	from	their	shareholders.	As	a	con-
sequence,	the	Russian	banks’	indicators	have	significantly	deteriorated.	For	
example,	on	1	October	2016	their	asset	profitability	was	the	sector’s	lowest	and	
stood	at	-32.3%	for	VTB	Bank,	-19.35%	for	BM	Bank,	-14.10%	for	Prominvestbank,	
with	the	average	ratio	for	Ukraine’s	banking	sector	as	a	whole	being -5.46%.	This	
has	led	to	a	situation	in	which	Russian	banks	began	for	all	intents	and	purposes	
to	vegetate	while	trying	to	survive	hard	times.	A	portion	of	them	are	making	
attempts	to	withdraw	from	the	Ukrainian	market	and	sell	their	shares.	Rep-
resentatives	of	Prominvestbank	and	Vnesheconombank	and	other	banks	have	
announced	their	intention	to	sell	their	shares	in	banks	in	Ukraine.	However,	
a	buyer	is	yet	to	be	found.	In	May	2017,	two	potential	buyers	announced	their	
intention	to	buy	shares	in	Prominvestbank:	Ukrainian	oligarch	Oleksandr	Ya-
roslavsky	(owner	of	the	DCH	group)	and	a	consortium	created	by	Pavel	Fuks	
15	 Data	for	banks	whose	investors	are	registered	in	Russia.
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(a	Russian	investor	in	the	property	development	sector)	and	Maksym	Mykytas	
(a	Ukrainian	MP).	Potential	investors	are	scared	off	by	Ukraine’s	persistently	
difficult	economic	situation	and	the	poor	financial	standing	of	Russian	banks,	
which	require	major	funds	for	investment.	Russian	shareholders,	on	their	part,	
are	not	willing	to	excessively	invest	in	their	Ukrainian	companies	due	to	the	
risk	of	losing	major	outlays	(they	will	recapitalise	their	banks	so	that	these	can	
survive	on	the	market,	but	will	avoid	development-oriented	investment).	Be-
sides	this,	it	is	unfavourable	for	them	to	sell	their	assets	at	an	excessively	low	
price	and	to	withdraw	from	the	market	with	major	losses.
Alfa	Bank	has	adopted	a	unique	manner	of	operating	on	the	Ukrainian	market.	
It	positions	itself	as	a	European	bank	and	the	NBU	does	not	consider	it	to	be	
a	Russian	bank.	It	has	even	managed	to	develop	its	business	–	in	October	2016	it	
took	over	100%	of	shares	in	Ukrsotsbank	(Ukraine’s	sixth	largest	bank)	owned	
by	the	Italian	bank	UniCredit16.	In	March	2017,	100%	of	shares	in	Sberbank-
Ukraina	(the	seventh	largest	bank)	was	sold	to	a	consortium	led	by	Said	Guts-
eriyev,	son	of	the	Russian	oligarch	Mikhail	Gutseriyev.	The	consortium	included	
an	undisclosed	company	registered	in	Belarus	and	controlled	by	Gutseriyev	
and	the	Latvian	bank	Norvik	Banka	(owned	by	Grigoriy	Guselnikov	who	holds	
dual	Russian	and	British	citizenship).	This	transaction	also	illustrates	a	certain	
manner	of	operation	applied	by	Russian	investors	which	involves	transferring	
ownership	of	banks	to	companies	registered	in	EU	countries	instead	of	Russian	
companies	giving	up	control	of	these	banks.	This	is	intended	to	help	them	build	
up	a	positive	image	for	these	banks	as	European	banks.	It	is	also	meant	to	enable	
the	banks	to	escape	potential	restrictions	and	sanctions	that	the	Ukrainian	gov-
ernment	may	impose	on	Russian	companies.	For	example,	in	March	2017	Kyiv	
banned	the	transfer	to	Russia	of	funds	from	Russian	banks	operating	in	Ukraine	
in	reaction	to	Russia	recognising	documents	issued	by	the	Donetsk	and	Luhansk	
separatist	republics.
16	 The	transaction	involved	an	asset	swap.	The	owner	of	Alfa	Bank,	ABH	Holdings,	took	over	
100%	of	shares	in	Ukrsotsbank	in	exchange	for	transferring	9.9%	of	its	shares	to	UniCredit.
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VIII. the polItIcal consequences of the changes 
In the BankIng sector
The	changes	in	the	banking	sector	have	important	consequences	for	the	political	
system	in	Ukraine.	This	is	particularly	evident	in	two	areas:	1)	the	position	of	
oligarchic	groups	in	the	system	(the	oligarchic	banking	discussed	above	formed	
an	important	tool	for	them	to	generate	profit	and	build	influence);	2)	the	poten-
tial	attempts	by	oligarchs	to	influence	politicians	holding	power	by	using	the	
instrument	of	control	of	the	banking	system.
The	collapse	of	banks	with	private	Ukrainian	capital,	that	belonged	to	major	
and	minor	oligarchs,	has	limited	the	array	of	tools	these	oligarchs	can	use	to	
build	their	business	position	in	specific	sectors	of	the	economy	and	the	oppor-
tunities	to	apply	certain	fund	transferring	schemes.	This	has	weakened	the	
oligarchs’	influence	on	the	banking	sector	and,	more	generally,	on	the	economy	
as	a	whole.	For	example,	at	present	it	is	more	difficult	for	them	to	obtain	funds	
from	the	market	and	to	take	out	loans	using	oligarchic	banking	schemes	(or	
so-called	‘captive	banking’).	The	remaining	banks	operating	on	the	market	that	
are	foreign-owned	and	profit-oriented	apply	a	very	cautious	lending	strategy	
and	require	loans	to	be	properly	secured,	which	makes	siphoning	off	funds	via	
these	banks	increasingly	difficult.	Due	to	stepped-up	control	on	the	part	of	the	
regulator,	increased	transparency	of	operations	and	ownership	structure	con-
nections,	as	well	as	legal	changes	introduced	by	the	government	in	collabora-
tion	with	and	under	strong	pressure	from	Western	partners	(the	IMF,	the	EU,	
the	USA),	the	functioning	of	the	former	oligarchic	banking	model	with	all	its	
pathologies	will	no	longer	be	possible.	Rinat	Akhmetov’s	PUMB	is	the	only	major	
bank	owned	by	an	oligarch	that	has	survived.	It	has	done	so	because	it	adjusted	
its	corporate	governance	and	operating	model	to	market	standards.	The	legal	
changes	and	the	increased	supervision	of	financial	flows	in	the	context	of	money	
laundering	will	be	of	particular	importance,	especially	for	combating	corrup-
tion,	even	if	it	is	likely	to	take	several	years	to	implement	them	in	full.
These	changes	may	result	in	limiting	specific	oligarchs’	capability	to	influence	
the	political	system	via	the	banking	sector	in	its	current	form.	Theoretically,	
the	weakening	of	the	formerly	very	strong	status	of	oligarchs	in	the	banking	
sector	may	enable	the	government	to	strengthen	the	state’s	position	towards	
the	oligarchs.	One	example	may	be	the	nationalisation	of	PrivatBank	that	used	
to	belong	to	the	highly	influential	Ihor	Kolomoyskyi	(and	his	business	partner	
Henadiy	Boholyubov).	Kolomoyskyi	took	advantage	of	his	control	of	Ukraine’s	
largest	bank	–	a	bank	of	significance	for	the	country’s	banking	system	as	a	whole	
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–	to	put	pressure	on	the	government	and	to	obtain	political	decisions	he	found	
favourable.	The	functioning	of	a	bank	of	this	size	has	a	significant	impact	not	
only	on	the	banking	system	but	also	on	the	country’s	economy	as	a	whole,	and	
the	government	was	forced	to	take	this	into	account.	When	other	banks	became	
insolvent,	the	influence	other	oligarchs	had	on	the	banking	sector	weakened.	
This	concerns	mainly	oligarchs	linked	to	former	president	Yanukovych	(in-
cluding	Oleksandr	Yanukovych,	Kurchenko,	Ivanyushchenko,	Arbuzov),	but	
also	Dmytro	Firtash,	Vadym	Novinsky,	Vasyl	Khmelnytsky,	Oleh	Bakhmatyuk,	
Kostyantyn	Zhevago,	Viktor	Pinchuk	and	others.
This	does	not	mean	that	the	oligarchs	are	losing	their	instruments	to	exert	in-
fluence	on	the	political	system.	However,	it	does	mean	that	the	former	schemes	
for	influencing	the	political	system	via	the	banking	sector	are	likely	to	change.	
The	oligarchs’	influence	persists	both	in	the	banking	system	and	in	the	political	
system	as	a	whole.	However,	the	changes	that	happened	in	the	banking	sector	
and	the	implemented	reforms	inspire	a	change	in	the	form	and	the	manner	of	
building	tools	to	exert	political	influence	and	the	use	of	banks	and	the	banking	
sector	to	pursue	this	practice.
Rafał SadowSki
Work on this paper was completed in May 2017
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appendIX 
Ukraine’s	20	largest	banks	as	on	1	January	2017
no. name owners, proportion of shares, in %
1 PrivatBank the state, represented by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 
100%
2 Oschadbank the state, represented by the Council of Ministers 100%
3 Ukreximbank the state, represented by the Council of Ministers 100%
4 Ukrgasbank the state, represented by the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 
100%
5 Raiffeisen Aval Raiffeisen Bank International AG 68% (Austria); European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development 30%
6 Ukrsotsbank ABH Holdings 99%
7 Sberbank
100% of shares belonged to Sberbank of Russia; in March 
2017 they were sold to a consortium belonging to Norvik Banka 
(Latvia) and an undisclosed company registered in Belarus
8 UkrSibbank
BNP Paribas S.A. 59% (France); Société Fédérale de Participation 
et d’lnvestissement 10% (Belgium); European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 40%
9 PUMB Rinat Akhmetov 99%
10 Alfa Bank ABH Holdings 100% 
11 Prominvestbank Vnesheconombank (VEB) 99% (Russia)
12 Crédit Agricole Crédit Agricole S.A. 99.9% (France)
13 OTP Bank OTP Bank 100% (Hungary)
14 VTB Bank VTB Bank 99.99% (Russia)
15 Pivdennyi Bank a group of businessmen from Odessa: Yuri Rodin 18%; Mark 
Bekker 19%; Alla Vanetsyants 11% and others.
16 Citibank Citigroup Inc 100% (United States)
17 ING Bank 
Ukraina
ING Group N.V. 100% (Netherlands)
18 ProCredit Bank ProCredit Holding AG&Co. KGaA (Germany, Belgium, Nether-
lands, USA) 72%; KfW Group (Germany) 27.8%
19 Kredobank PKO BP 99.5% (Poland)
20 Megabank
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 15%; KfW 
(Germany) 15%; the government of Germany (15%); International 
Finance Corporation (USA, World Bank) 6%, Viktor Subbotin 
(a businessman from Kharkiv) 5%
